We’re pleased to announce that as of July 14, 2021, SIM card changes have been re-enabled in My Account.
We have now implemented an additional step in the form of a 2 factor-authentication code to secure this process. This code can be sent via SMS or email, and must be verified to complete the SIM swap.
For more details, please see below.
All the information below can be found in this Help Article.
What is SIM swap fraud?
Efforts by fraudsters to gain unauthorized access to customer accounts with the goal of accessing banking information is on the rise. As part of our commitment to protect our customers’ personal information, we have robust security protocols in place that are designed to protect the privacy and security of our customers.
SIM swap fraud, or SIM jacking, is a type of fraud that occurs when fraudsters gain access to your Self Serve account, to replace your SIM card information with their own. After replacing your SIM card, all communications will be redirected to the fraudster’s device. They will then be able to intercept recovery SMS/calls, and gain access to your personal banking, ecommerce, email and social media accounts.
How does SIM swap fraud happen?
Fraudsters can obtain customer Self Serve account credentials through malware, phishing attempts or data breaches on websites where login credentials are the same as your Self Serve account.
How do I know if I’ve been targeted by a SIM swap fraud?
You may have been a target of SIM swap fraud if you have suddenly lost service for no apparent reason. If this is the case, please follow the below steps to confirm your SIM card information has not changed.
What do I do if I’ve been targeted by SIM swap fraud?
If you have been targeted by SIM swap fraud, we recommend you take the following actions to secure your account:
How to protect against SIM swap fraud?
Given the increase the telecommunications industry has seen in fraudulent activity like SIM swaps and unauthorized porting, we recommend that Canadians take the following steps to protect themselves:
While Public Mobile is actively working on ways to help keep our customers safe, please make sure to stay vigilant, and be aware of any suspicious activity.
- The Public Mobile Team
I agree with @z10user4
We seen before that people got simjacked and unable to logon to My Account. So, either their My Account was compromised first or the email was first compromised and then My Account.
But of course, many people requiring SIM swap because they lost their phone or the old SIM was broken and hence they were unable to receive the SMS and an alternate way is needed, sadly in this case, email....
Let's see how it goes and hope for the best.
Great to see that the option for self-serve SIM Swap is back... particularly for @darlicious's significant other who seems to go through a new SIM every month! 😂
In terms of security, I agree that time will tell whether this is an effective solution or not. It's a great step in the right direction, and the added challenge will definitely make things more secure. How secure it really is will all depend... if somebody really wants access to your account/SIM/whatever, there are many ways of doing it through any variety of ways, social engineering, technical espionage, or however else.
While a TOTP code (or similar) is a good idea, the "ideal solution" is often tricky to define. In particular, the logistics behind it would be difficult.
For example, let's say this is set up upon activation. Will the average Public Mobile user know how this works? If the user changes phones or loses their phone, how would they have access to the application? This would need to be set up well in advanced and maintained by the user (and Public Mobile). There are also backend considerations for Public Mobile to maintain... more systems and maintenance = higher cost.
Although it's one secure way of handling things, not sure how feasible it actually would be. The moderators here have been very helpful with problems, and I think it's a small inconvenience for us to involve them for the "occasional" SIM card swap (and now- self serve!) than to pay more every month because this would surely increase the expenses on their end. 🙂
It's good to see pm has implemented a compromise between customer self-serve and account security. However given some of the observations by fellow members that 2FA may not be possible or a customer does not have access to their account or possibly has not created one does the ability to perform a sim swap with the moderators operate in the same manner?
Seeing as I have performed this action more than probably anyone here and do so on behalf of the bf who hasn't a clue how to do any of this..... I cannot perform a sim swap for him if the phone or sim card is lost. Why is there no possibility of recieving the code via a phone call? It makes the verification code accessible without the device and the lost/stolen feature has suspended service.
Could we not have an option to change the email and/or phone number used for 2FA? As its been pointed out the blanked out email and phone number is already accessible in the account and a likely source of a breach or hacker or a thief. From an account management side without access to the phone or email it makes a sim swap within the account a non-starter. Not having the phone call option is a huge oversight in my opinion.
I still believe having the ability to change the login username from the accounts email would greatly improve account security especially since that ability to perform that action already exists.
The bf did indeed go thru entire last 30 day cycle without enabling lost/stolen and had his rewards actually apply upon renewal! The second time in 22 months that I did not have to contact the moderators to have them applied manually.
At no time do you have to use your real name to activate and create your pm account. You can edit those details of your profile at anytime by logging into your self serve account. Changing the account holder name has been employed as an effectuve means of preventing fraudulent ports.